

Globalization, Culture, and Identities in Crisis

Robert J. Lieber*[‡] and Ruth E. Weisberg[†]

Culture in its various forms now serves as a primary carrier of globalization and modern values, and constitutes an important arena of contestation for national, religious, and ethnic identity. Although reactions in Europe, Japan, and other societies where modern values prevail, tend to be symbolic, in areas of the developing world, especially in Muslim countries where traditional values and radically different notions of identity and society predominate, reactions tend to be very intense and redirected at external targets through forms of transference and scapegoating. Ultimately, this is not so much a clash between civilizations as a clash within civilizations.

KEY WORDS: culture; globalization; identity; transference; backlash.

GLOBALIZATION AND CULTURE

Globalization and its discontents has taken on huge significance in the aftermath of September 11th. Driven by the end of the Cold War, a dramatic surge in international trade, investment and finance, and the onset of the information revolution, the subject had attracted growing attention for more than a decade. However, the traumatic events of 9/11, the nihilistic rage evident in the destruction of the World Trade Center, and the issues that have arisen in its aftermath provide an enormous new impetus.

Until very recently, analyses of globalization have emphasized economics and politics rather than culture. Definitions of globalization abound,

*Professor of Government & Foreign Service, Department of Government, Georgetown University, Washington, DC.

[†]Dean, School of Fine Arts, University of Southern California, Watt Hall 103, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0292.

[‡]Correspondence should be directed to Robert J. Lieber, Professor of Government & Foreign Service, Department of Government, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20057-1034; e-mail: lieberr@georgetown.edu.

but for our purposes it can be described as the increasing global integration of economies, information technology, the spread of global popular culture, and other forms of human interaction.¹ In the polarized discussion of the subject, one side has tended to be relentlessly optimistic and, at least until the September attacks, enthusiasm about globalization as a whole was sometimes accompanied by an almost blissful naivete about the information revolution as an unalloyed blessing. In the words of Bill Clinton shortly before leaving the presidency, "In the new century, liberty will be spread by cell phone and cable modem."² On the other side, globalization inspires dire warnings about its disruptions or dangers as well as organized protests, editorials and marches against its perceived inequities and abuses.

As an artist and a political scientist, our contribution to this discussion is to probe the intersection of culture and politics. The effect is synergistic, in that by doing so we gain insights that neither a focus on culture nor politics alone can provide. An apt analogy exists with the study of political economy, which explores the interplay of politics and economics in shaping international affairs. Often, examining events through a combination of two disciplines provides texture and understanding in ways that an exclusive disciplinary view does not allow.³ As a result, the combination of perspectives from culture and politics can offer comparably rich insights. While others have made reference to culture, they have tended to privilege politics and economics. One author who has emphasized culture is Samuel Huntington. In his writing on the "Clash of Civilizations,"⁴ he has argued that with the end of the Cold War and its contest of ideologies, and as a result of disruptions brought by modernization, urbanization and mass communications, the fundamental source of international conflict will not be primarily ideological or economic but cultural. However, our own view of culture is broader than that of Huntington and encompasses folk and high culture as well as popular culture. Moreover in our judgment, the ultimate clash is less between civilizations than *within* them.

The impact of globalization on culture has been viewed primarily as a side effect. Nonetheless, for those absorbed with the subject, reactions tend to be deeply divided. For example, one observer has asserted that, "... globalization promotes integration and the removal not only of cultural barriers but many of the negative dimensions of culture. Globalization is a vital step toward both a more stable world and better lives for the people within it."⁵ Others, however, have treated globalization of culture as an evil because of their fears of the pervasive power and duplicity of multinational corporations or international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In recent years, this reaction has been manifest in sometimes violent demonstrations when the leaders of the world's richest countries

(e.g., the G-8, the European Union) have held their meetings—as evident in the streets of Seattle, Washington, Genoa and Barcelona.

And who among us would not be disturbed by, for example, the echo of rap music in an old Barcelona neighborhood, the demise of local food products and neighborhood shops, or the proliferation of the same brands and chain stores from San Francisco to Santiago to Shanghai? Yet beyond unwarranted optimism or equally exaggerated negativity there is an underlying dynamic. We seek to explicate the deeper reasons for these strong but often oppositional reactions that people have to the effects of globalization on what they identify as their culture. By integrating perspectives from both culture and politics, we find that in an increasingly globalized world, culture has become a central arena of contestation. Culture takes on this pivotal position not only because of its intrinsic significance, but precisely because it has become so bound up with the most fundamental questions of human identity in its many dimensions: personal, ethnic, religious, social and national. As a result, controversies about culture often have less to do with surface level phenomena: McDonalds, American tastes in music, language, art and lifestyle, than with deeper forms of alienation that owe more to the changes and disruptions brought by modernization and globalization. In some cultures, especially in parts of the Middle East, South Asia and Africa, there is an important added dimension of existential rage against corrupt and authoritarian regimes that, with the breakdown of older traditional social, political and economic relationships, have failed to meet the needs of their own societies. In these regions, resentments expressed about modernity, the West or America are often a sublimation of rage against more deep rooted problems of identity.

In the western world and in more prosperous regions of East Asia and Latin America, where domestic problems of acculturation are much less acute, cultural alienation tends to be based primarily on an uneasiness about the ubiquity of American culture and influence as well as on U.S. primacy more generally. These resentments often are less the preoccupation of the general public than of intellectual elites, who react against cultural intrusions into their own established realms and prerogatives. At times, such reactions can approach self-parody, as in the assertion that “resistance to the hegemonic pretenses of hamburgers is, above all, a cultural imperative.”⁶ Specific criticisms thus can have more to do with what the U.S., seems to symbolize than with any specific characteristic of American culture or policy in itself.

We begin this essay by analyzing the impact of a virtually unprecedented degree of American cultural primacy. We next consider culture as an arena of contestation, noting the contradictory impulses of both attraction and repulsion as well as the phenomena of differentiation and assimilation.

These reactions can be observed across the range of mass culture, folk culture and high culture. We then examine culture as a problem of identity in an era of globalization. We find that although both globalization and American primacy evoke cultural backlash, the reaction takes very different forms in modern societies than elsewhere. We explore two distinct causes of cultural anxiety and turmoil. One of these, the material effects of globalization and modernity, including the consumer economy, the information revolution and the mass media, provides both a window to the wider world and a challenge to traditional ways of doing things. The other, Western values, is often more profound in its impact, even though more intangible.

Cultural reactions to globalization in Europe, Japan and elsewhere where modern values prevail, tend to be more symbolic and less extreme and often have more to do with status resentments than with disagreements about fundamental values. But in large areas of the developing world and especially in many Muslim countries, reactions to globalization and to the U.S. as the embodiment of capitalism, modernity and mass culture tend to be much more intense. We posit that in these societies, radically different notions of values and identity are played out in the cultural realm, with much of the impetus stemming from rage at corrupt regimes and failed societies, which is then redirected at external targets through forms of transference. By transference we are referring to the process by which group fears or resentments are shifted onto other entities or groups. Intense cultural resentments thus come to be focused upon actors, especially the U.S., the West and Israel, that bear little relationship to the problems at hand yet provide convenient scapegoats.

CULTURE AND AMERICAN PRIMACY

In the 21st century, the United States enjoys a degree of international preponderance that has rarely been seen in any era. Historians, strategists, journalists and cultural observers have called attention to the phenomenon in increasingly hyperbolic terms. In the words of one recent observer, "We dominate every field of human endeavor from fashion to film to finance. We rule the world culturally, economically, diplomatically and militarily as no one has since the Roman Empire."⁷ The United States, with less than 5% of the world's population, accounts for at least one-fourth of its economic activity. It leads in the information revolution. It accounts for some 75% of the Nobel prizewinners in science, medicine and economics.⁸ It predominates in business and banking and in the number and quality of its research universities. Its defense budget is larger than those

of the next fifteen countries combined. And there are few signs that any other international actor will soon become a true competitor of the United States.

This American primacy is the product of the country's own attributes (population, economic strength, technology, military preponderance, social dynamism), as well as of the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. With the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, the U.S. no longer faces any country possessing even remotely comparable power. For much of the period since at least the mid-17th century, international politics had been characterized by balance of power rivalry involving competition among a number of great powers (typically France, Britain, Russia, Spain, Austria, Prussia and later Germany.) After World War II, world politics became bipolar with the onset of the Cold War and the superpower confrontation between the US and USSR. Since the early 1990s, however, the United States has occupied a unique position, and its degree of primacy has grown rather than diminished with time. Moreover, the very scale of America's relative power compared to other countries tends to discourage challenges from other would-be world powers.⁹

Influence in the cultural arena is more difficult to gauge than in the economic or military realms. Although many of the criteria are less specific and more subjective, here too American preponderance is evident. An astute German diplomat, Karsten Voight, long acquainted with the United States, has aptly characterized the pervasiveness of this influence in the cultural realm:

The USA has long been setting standards on a worldwide basis, not just for the general populace, but has been leading the field in the classic cultural spheres, for example in research and teaching, or film and modern art. Its global role is rooted in a hitherto unknown blend of economic power, the ability to set the global cultural agenda and military superiority.¹⁰

Moreover, this influence is evident not only in what Voight refers to as the classic cultural spheres, but is even more pronounced in mass culture, where American popular music, casual clothing, movies, advertising media, fast food and sports (notably basketball) have become pervasive.

A particularly ubiquitous feature that confers enormous influence is the spread of American English as an international lingua franca. A century ago, French was the language of diplomacy and German was the leading scientific language as well as extensively used in Central and Eastern Europe. By the mid 20th century, Russian was the predominant second language throughout the Soviet sphere in Central Asia and in Eastern Europe. Now, however, it is English that prevails. For example, at the United Nations, 120 countries specify English as the language in which correspondence to their missions should be addressed. By contrast some forty countries (mostly

former French colonies) choose French, while twenty designate Spanish.¹¹ In much of the world, English has become widely used and is by far the leading choice for those who aspire to communicate outside their own locality. English is the language shared by the different communities of India (or at least by their educated, commercial or political elites), it is overwhelmingly the second language in China and is often taught as a required subject in primary or secondary schools throughout Europe and Asia. Stories abound of bilateral meetings of foreign leaders who are not fluent in each other's languages, conversing in English which they share as a second tongue.

The inroads made by American English have been growing with globalization and as a consequence of America's power and influence. Approximately 380 million people use English as their first language and another 250 million as their second language. A billion people are learning English, and approximately one-third of the world's population have some exposure to it. English is the predominant language of the European Union, and more than 85% of international organizations employ it as one of their official languages.¹² To the intense irritation of French cultural and political elites and despite annual expenditures of some \$1 billion per year to promote that country's language and culture, French is now ranked only ninth among the world's most widely spoken languages. And four of France's most important and dynamic international businesses, Alcatel, Total-FinaElf, Airbus and Vivendi, have made English their official language.¹³

Entertainment is another cultural realm in which American influence is pervasive. This takes various forms. Hollywood films capture more than 70% of the Western European audience and have a huge market share elsewhere, in some cases as much as 90%.¹⁴ Here too, France has sought to stem the tide through regulations and subsidies. Paris has ardently asserted a "cultural exception" in trade negotiations, and under prevailing international agreements the countries of the European Union can impose quotas on imported American music and television programs as well as movies. France requires that at least 40% of TV and radio programs be made domestically and maintains an elaborate system for subsidizing its movie industry.¹⁵

The results, however, are modest. In 2001, only four of the top ten films at the French box office were French, led by the light comedy "Amelie."¹⁶ Yet this was an improvement on the previous year, when only one out of twenty French-made films was a hit and Hollywood swept 91% of the country's film revenues among summer audiences.¹⁷ The heyday of French cinema in the 1930s and again in the late 1950s and the 1960s, when its directors, actors and films were a significant presence in world cinema, is a fading memory. When French films have been at all competitive, this is mostly a result of

Table 1. Western European Film Statistics (1999)

Host country	American market share
Germany	76.0%
Spain	64.2
France	54.1
Italy	53.6
U.K.	86.0*
Denmark	58.7

*Data for UK for 1998.

SOURCE: Media Sales, Milan Italy, *www.mediasalles.it*, adapted from tabular data in Tyler Cowen, “Why Hollywood Rules the World (and Should We Care?)” in *Correspondence*, Summer/Fall 2001, p. 7.

embracing those features for which Hollywood has been criticized. In the words of one French critic:

French cinema is allowing itself everything American cinema used to be blamed for: sex, violence, epic-scale historical reconstruction. All that distinguishes France’s biggest hits of 2000 from some American B-movie is that the car chase is happening in Marseille, not Los Angeles, among Peugeotts, not Chryslers. And the repetitiveness we once condemned in such hit film series as *Rocky*, *Rambo*, and *Halloween*, is becoming a more French practice too...¹⁸

Elsewhere in Europe, the pervasiveness of American films is even more evident. For example in Berlin, following the opening of a huge business and entertainment complex at the Potsdammer Platz, a multiplex cinema there featured Hollywood films on eight of its nine screens. The sole exception was a German action film with an English title, “Crazy,” clearly comparable in content to the French movies cited above in their embrace of Hollywood clichés.¹⁹ Overall, in five leading countries of the EU, the U.S. market share of the cinema audience has ranged from just under 54% in Italy to 76% in Germany and 86% in the United Kingdom. (See Table 1.)

CULTURE AS AN ARENA OF CONTESTATION

As we have previously suggested, culture understood as popular, folk or high art has become a major arena of contestation as conflicts of nationalism and ethnicity are played out in the cultural realm. Certain concepts are especially illuminating in the analysis of cultural conflict and change. First, attraction and toleration as contrasted to repulsion and suppression of cultural expression; and second, the sometimes simultaneous impulses toward differentiation and assimilation.

In regard to the first dynamic, in the spring of 2001, the world learned of the deliberate demolition of two 5th to 7th century giant cliff side carvings

of the Buddha. Although these artifacts had been designated a World Historic Monument by the UN, Afghanistan's Taliban rulers and other Islamic militants used artillery and explosives to demolish them. They also destroyed with sledgehammers much of the Buddhist patrimony stored or displayed in Afghan museums. This was especially shocking for contemporary Westerners, who tend to value cultural artifacts very highly and who generally neutralize the ideology or beliefs inherent in sculpture or painting by redefining it as belonging to the category of art, where it tends to acquire great secular and monetary value. However, 20th century Western history also includes haunting episodes of the symbolic destruction of culture, most notably in the Nazi book burnings.

The destruction of the ancient Buddhas is a dramatic and appalling episode of cultural suppression. Indeed it has been referred to as "a cultural and historical Hiroshima" in a *Washington Post* article. The same story quotes notes from a meeting between Taliban officials and Islamic militants: "The Taliban authorities agreed the destruction of [the statues] is an Islamic act that would make the Islamic world happy."²⁰

The spectrum of responses to cultural phenomena is very broad. It ranges, at one end, from the extreme just cited, through hostility to toleration and attraction at the other end. Most interestingly, attraction and repression can happen simultaneously. Human beings seem to respond to a number of siren songs in this area: enforced rarity, the exotic, the transgressive and the forbidden among others. Dick Hebdige's book about the way subcultures affect the dominant culture, especially in regard to the cycling of styles and artifacts of subcultures into the mainstream, is pertinent here.²¹ There are many historical examples. For instance, in 18th century Spain, the colorful world of the Maja, with its brigands and courtesans, influenced the high culture of the court in the time of Goya. In the late 19th century, the demimonde in Paris made a huge imprint on popular culture and the Impressionist and Post-Impressionist art movements as well, particularly in the works of Degas and Toulouse-Lautrec. A dynamic of attraction/repulsion between high culture and associated elites and transgressive outsiders is a phenomenon that periodically emerges. The popularity of movies about gangsters and outlaws is no accident.

What is the mechanism at work here? Reason may argue for one set of choices, and emotion or a deep-seated sense of attraction or identity may press for another. Samuel Huntington has written that "cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones."²² This may help explain why nations, and ethnic and religious groups as well as individuals sometimes make choices that appear so irrational and against their best interests.

The other pair of often simultaneous tendencies that characterize the reception of culture involves impulses toward differentiation and assimilation. Both tendencies are dynamic. We are constantly borrowing, imitating and incorporating just as we are distinguishing and differentiating ourselves by innovative, exclusive or singular expressions.

When culture is discussed in relation to globalization, it is most often American popular or mass culture that is the referent, and the rhetoric about it is highly charged. For example, Louis Hebron and John F. Stack describe the negative view of the globalization of mass culture in this way: "This foreign invasion and assimilation of cosmopolitan consumerism with its materialistic orientation, indulgent values, moral bankruptcy and fraternizing of nationalities is a prescription of cultural genocide because of the process' potential to vulgarize and/or destroy the rich diversity of human civilizations."²³

This is similar to the argument of antiglobalization advocates alleging the destruction of biodiversity by American corporate interests. In the view of these critics, part of the richness of human culture is its variety, its trueness to its own cultural roots, but global popular culture dominated by American products and ideas destroys this diversity of cultural production. So there is fear and backlash against what is viewed as a leveling force, a sweeping homogeneity or Disneyfication of culture. The rhetoric surrounding the globalization of culture, sometimes compares it to colonialism, as evident for example, in the criticism by President Mohammed Khatami of Iran:

[Globalization is] a destructive force threatening dialogue between cultures. The new world order and globalization that certain powers are trying to make us accept, in which the culture of the entire world is ignored, looks like a kind of neocolonialism. This imperialism threatens mutual understanding between nations and communication and dialogue between cultures.²⁴

Rather than mounting a critique of the globalization of culture, we propose to analyze historical and political causes which make culture a major arena of contestation for nationalism and ethnicity. Three partially overlapping cultural arenas are encompassed in this analysis, first and most obviously, popular culture; second, folk or indigenous culture; and lastly, an arena that is not often discussed in this context, high culture.

Popular culture is the most obvious realm because there is a pervasive influence of American music, fashion, food, movies, TV, all tied to open markets and global consumerism. This influence is in part a reflection of what is often called "soft power."²⁵ The U.S. does not force anyone to use these American products, but they have, nevertheless, enormous popularity and consumer attraction. Although U.S. products have the advantage of well capitalized production and distribution, as Richard Pells indicates, American capitalism is not the only or even the most important explanation for the "soft

power” of the United States. In Pell’s words, “What Americans have done more brilliantly than their competitors overseas is repackage the cultural products we receive from abroad and then transmit them to the rest of the planet.”²⁶ Our history as a nation of immigrants has taught us to synthesize and incorporate the cultural and popular expressions of a wide range of nationalities and ethnicities. We are the consumers of foreign intellectual and artistic influences par excellence.

“American” is as much a style as a point of origin. Many “American” products are made elsewhere, and there is also the influence of French, British, Japanese, and German products or imitations of them. Japan is perhaps the most distinctive global alternative to American culture. An example, is the “Hello Kitty” phenomenon. There are shops in malls across the United States that have “Hello Kitty” products, which were originally designed for little Japanese girls. They are by design sentimental, plastic and pink and quite popular with little girls in the United States, many of whose backpacks and pencil cases are part of the “Hello Kitty” line. And fascinatingly, there is a subculture on the West Coast with its own flagship magazine called *Giant Robot*, which comments on this and similar phenomena of reverse cultural influence.

Although, as noted above, American movies have a huge influence abroad, the action films that dominate international markets represent the reverse phenomenon. They are manifestations of a global market affecting the production of American film making. Half or more of the gross revenues for some Hollywood films come from foreign audiences. As a result, and because younger moviegoers make up a disproportionate share of the audience, American action movies, especially those aimed at Asian markets, are characterized more by their violence or explosiveness (which requires little translation) than by their dialogue. The de-emphasis on language and the tendency toward highly demarcated good and evil is appealing across many cultures.

Folk or indigenous culture is another arena where observers lament the effects of globalization as damaging to indigenous cultural production. Yet the concerned parties are often not from the cultures in question. There is a great deal of idealization of the cultures involved, as folkways tend to be viewed as pure, authentic and unchanging. Folk art, rather than demonstrating purity, provides an excellent case study of the dynamics of assimilation and differentiation as it is usually a mixture of local production and aesthetics with outside influences. Two instances from Navajo culture illustrate this point. The rugs we view as so characteristic of the Navajos were greatly influenced by the late 19th century discovery on the part of the Navajos of German aniline dyes. If we examined the rugs made before the Navajos adopted the use of these dyes, they would not seem to us to be Navajo rugs

because of their subdued appearance, a consequence of the more limited color range obtained by dyeing the wool with vegetable matter. Another example is the great bifurcation of design in Navajo jewelry which was heavily influenced by native aesthetics on one hand and tourist preferences on the other. What they did for themselves tended to be very heavy and bold because they were designing jewelry emblematic of power. The more delicate, graceful, somewhat subdued jewelry was geared to tourist preferences. The Navajos were quite willing to create two modes of production geared to two different audiences, which is a sophisticated marketing technique. These are clear examples of cultural output influenced by foreign technology and tourist preferences. Among other things, we thus ought to view folk culture as more complex and more calculated than it is generally conceived.

While popular culture dominates the public discourse about globalization, high culture also acts as an arena of contestation. An additional reason for focusing on high culture is its connection to the governing elites in any country. A smaller number of influential people involved in international or global dynamics can weigh more than a larger number involved in popular culture. There are numerous focal points for international cultural presentation, exchange and collaboration. They include biennials, festivals, architectural competitions and the internet. One of the most visible sites for global high culture is the museum, which has traditionally been seen as an aid to civic, national, or ethnic identity. Typically, museums came into being through the secularization of royal, court or church collections, which were made public in national or municipal forums.

The history of the Museum Bilbao in the Basque region of northern Spain illustrates a number of the issues we are addressing, such as identity formation and assimilation versus differentiation. In the late 19th century, the elites of Bilbao were in intellectual ferment, characteristic of that era, concerning what they viewed as a choice between their local folkloric legacy and the cosmopolitan culture of the late 19th century. Very similar tensions developed in different locales around the world. Nations were becoming much more aware of their folkloric heritage and the field of ethnography was expanding. In Germany, where the subject had already become well established as an aspect of the Romantic movement of the 1830s, people increasingly collected and valued folk material as a source of local or ethnic pride. At the same time, because of a number of different phenomena including world fairs, there was a growing sense of positive identification with national cultural production. And beyond the nation-state, a cosmopolitan art world was coming into being. One result of this more international awareness and diffusion of information was the rapid spread, for instance, of French Impressionism as it came to influence American, Spanish and Italian art by the last decade of the 19th century.

Note that there are at least three related terms pertinent to this discussion that seem to overlap in meaning but have different valences and connotations. These are the words cosmopolitan, international, and global. They can all be applied to culture and they all carry different baggage. The term cosmopolitan, arising in the second half of the 19th century, had a worldly, urbane, sophisticated sense to it. It was associated with high culture and particularly with things French. Cosmopolitanism in Iran, Russia and the United States in the 19th century embodied French cultural dominance. In the 20th century, that mutated into a negative connotation, especially within the Communist world, as in “rootless cosmopolitan,” while lately it seems back in favor as a term of approbation. Internationalism, while identified with Western culture, is not dominated by one particular country. It is also a word more applicable to the 20th century. In the art world, it referred to the elite style of a period, although it also had an idealistic connotation. In architecture, the “international style” was a manifestation of 20th century modernism, and in the realm of painting, abstract expressionism exemplified internationalism in the immediate post-World War Two period. Globalization, in turn, has recently acquired more negative connotations and is less strictly tied to high culture, as it has come to be identified with consumerism and Disneyfication.

The Basques, with their distinctive culture and language, were, and still are, a particular blend of ethnicity, cosmopolitanism, anti-Spanish, and anti-Madrid sentiments. In the late 19th century, their choice was between a strong ethnic identity and a more cosmopolitan one, and oscillation between those two poles has characterized their situation throughout the 20th and into the 21st century. In the 1990s, a group of industrial and civic leaders from the region decided that internationalism was the best choice for Bilbao, and became very interested in having their city become the site for a new European Guggenheim Museum. To quote Selma Holo’s *Beyond the Prado*:

It would enable the civic leaders, with the assistance of a small group of advocates to convince enough of the elite population of the city that rejection of the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao, would be tantamount to scuttling any chance for Bilbao to assume a modern identity or protect the regional identity. These new institutions were meant to prove that the intent of the politicians to support internationalism would not preclude their aggressive support for Basque cultural identity reinforcement.²⁷

So Basque identity and a modern identity became linked: the Museum would solve both problems. As in the 19th Century, much of this attitude was fueled by a rejection of Central Spain and Spanish identity. Ironically, Basque elites traded off centralist Spain for centralist New York. In the end the Guggenheim Bilbao adopted an internationalist program for the museum, and regional artists of some quality were not shown there. The idea that Basque cultural identity would be promoted and supported was forgotten

once the spectacular building designed by Frank Gehry became a reality.

However, the payoff for Bilbao has been an extraordinary surge in cultural tourism. Bilbao provides a perfect illustration of the late 20th-early 21st century importance of museums as branding a city through a cultural attraction and, in the case of the Guggenheim in Bilbao, giving it a global presence. The Guggenheim with its various branches worldwide had approximately three million visitors in 2001, which compares favorably with giants like the Louvre with some six million visitors.

Biennials, music festivals, international architectural competitions, and cultural tourism are among the many ways nations or cities project themselves into the international art world. In contrast to the jockeying for position among cultural elites of many nations, there are more radical forms of contestation. As noted above, the Taliban banned culture altogether and severely punished transgressors, destroying an estimated 80% of Afghan cultural artifacts in the process. They burned more than 1000 reels of Afghan films, and a prominent musician who was caught playing his instrument was warned that if he were caught again, they would cut off his hands.²⁸ Afghanistan is an extreme case, but it shows how virulent cultural contestation can become.

CULTURE AS A PROBLEM OF IDENTITY IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION

Both globalization and American primacy evoke cultural backlash. But the character and magnitude of this reaction differ greatly depending on the societies in which they occur. Moreover, this reaction takes very different forms in the West and in other modern societies than in the developing world and especially in Muslim countries. The reason is that cultural anxiety and turmoil are a consequence of two related but distinct phenomena. First, there are the material and economic effects of globalization and modernity. Among these are urbanization, the appearance of modern consumer goods, and the impact of the mass media, including satellite television, movie cassettes and the internet. These provide a window to—and sometimes distorted impressions of—the outside world. A second element, western values, is more intangible but often more profound in its impact. These values include, among others, scientific reasoning, secularism, religious toleration, individualism, freedom of expression, political pluralism, the rule of law, equal rights for women and minorities, and openness to change. As one widely respected observer has commented, the result for much of the Islamic world is an “intractable confrontation between a theistic, land-based and traditional

culture, in places little different from the Europe of the Middle Ages, and the secular material values of the Enlightenment.”²⁹

In Europe, Canada, Japan and other societies, where modern values prevail, cultural reactions to globalization and to American predominance tend to be more nuanced. Intellectual, literary, artistic and political elites often seek ways to define or reassert their own identities and importance and their national cultures by confronting the policies and the material and cultural influences of the United States. In part, these reactions have less to do with Washington’s policies than with the imbalance of power and influence between their own countries and the United States. However, there are indications that the European public as a whole may not share these views to the same degree, and public opinion polls in France, whose intellectuals and officials are among Europe’s most strident critics, indicate possibly as little as 10% of the public is anti-American.³⁰ The critiques can become heated, but they remain largely symbolic and are often ephemeral. Indeed, in their use of hyperbole, they can approach caricature, at least in the case of the French, where they can take on the appearance of an elaborate verbal and aesthetic game, for example, in denunciations of Eurodisney as a “cultural Chernobyl.”³¹

Among the different forms of cultural reaction, scapegoating and transference are especially evident, whereby cultural and economic resentments are deflected from the original systemic causes such as globalization, modernization, urbanization, and economic rationalization, onto convenient symbolic targets. In France these phenomena have been evident in the highly publicized exploits of Jose Bove, an antiglobalization activist who learned his tactics while a foreign student at the University of California at Berkeley, and who in 1999 drove a tractor into a McDonald’s restaurant in the provincial town of Millau. However, the presence of more than 700 of these fast food restaurants in the country suggests that French consumers in large numbers find their own reasons to patronize the franchise.

While Europe and the United States share many cultural values and have a rich history of cross-fertilization, a contrasting component of European cultural reaction is evident in distrust of other facets of modernity. In Britain and France, as a result of deadly medical fiascos in the 1980s and 1990s, a degree of cynicism and suspicion has developed toward experts in modern science and technology. In the French case, the reaction stems from the government’s deliberate delay in licensing an American test for the HIV/AIDS virus in donated blood in order to await a French-made product. As a consequence, hundreds of people who received transfusions during this period became infected with the deadly virus. In Britain, public distrust reflects the “Mad Cow” disease experience in 1996, when public health officials mistakenly assured the public that there was no danger in

eating beef from diseased animals. The backlash has recently been apparent in the refusal of many British parents to have their infants inoculated for measles, mumps and rubella, not because of scientific evidence, but due to the speculation of a single doctor that the vaccine might cause autism.³² Reactions of this kind are also manifest, for example, in a European consumer backlash against genetically modified (GM) crops. Evidence of harm from products available to the public has never been documented. Nonetheless, without any scientific confirmation, the European Union has halted approval of new GM crops for use or import into the EU.³³

In the United States, globalization has had notable effects on basic values and beliefs. Paul Cantor, in his book *Gilligan Unbound: Pop Culture in the Age of Globalization*,³⁴ explores four television series over the course of four decades (*Gilligan's Island*, *Star Trek*, *The Simpsons*, and *The X-Files*) to demonstrate how globalization has undermined traditional attitudes concerning power, authority and the role of the state.³⁵ Cantor argues that the traditional importance of the state and of other national institutions has given way in the consciousness of most people (as represented, e.g., in *The Simpsons*) to focus on the family, neighbors and the marketplace. Indeed, Cantor maintains that as a result of the economic and cultural effects of globalization, together with the impact of mass media such as cable TV, the centrality of the nation-state in American life may be giving way to the family and other basic social units.

Whether this trend will persist is another matter. In part, it reflects the effects of a post-Cold War decade in which the absence of an external threat on the scale of World War Two or the Cold War, coupled with the impact of the information revolution and an extraordinary period of economic growth and lavish consumer spending caused Americans and the media to focus on ephemeral domestic stories about celebrities, life style, crime, and the sexual peccadillos of prominent personalities. The focus, magnified by cable television (all-Monica-all-the-time) on the sordid Clinton scandals, the O.J. Simpson trial, the lifestyles of dot.com billionaires, and celebrity gossip were among the most prominent cultural symbols of the 1990s. However, this absorption, together with waning public confidence in government, was the product of an era in which the role of the state at home and abroad seemed less essential.

In the aftermath of the September 11th terror attacks, the persistence of these trends is much less certain. The unprecedented nature and scope of the assault on the U.S. homeland, the mass murder of 3000 Americans, the very real threat from terror and weapons of mass destruction, and the effect on the U.S. economy have impacted the lives of ordinary Americans and may have transformative effects. The cultural impact of 9/11 can be gauged in many ways, big and small. One is the outpouring of unabashed

patriotic sentiment in response to the destruction of the World Trade Center and the bravery of passengers who fought with their hijackers on the doomed American Airlines flight #93. Other measures can be found in increased volunteerism, the broad-based and unselfconscious display of the flag, and in dramatic changes in public opinion. For example, trust in government and confidence in national institutions, including the presidency and Congress, has surged—at least temporarily—to the highest levels since the mid-1960s.³⁶ There has also been a perceptible shift in media tastes and in magazines and books. One straw in the wind is the collapse of *Talk* magazine, the brain child of celebrity editor Tina Brown.³⁷ Another was evident in the list of nonfiction best sellers. Illustratively, six months after the September 11th attacks, six of the top ten books were traditional or culturally conservative works. The list included, at #1 Tom Clancy's *Shadow Warriors* (U.S. special-operations forces); #2 Bernard Goldberg's *Bias* (liberal bias in news media); David Vise's, *The Bureau and the Mole* (Soviet spy Robert Hanssen); #6 David McCullough's *John Adams* (biography of the second president); #7 Bernard Lewis's *What Went Wrong* (failures of the Islamic world); #8 *One Nation* (photos and essays on September 11th by the editors of *Life*); and #10 Pat Buchanan's *Death of the West* (a warning about threats to western civilization by a right-wing columnist.)³⁸

The impact of globalization on American culture and the United States more broadly has had a number of contradictory effects. Until recently, globalization, along with the end of the Cold War, the information revolution and an economic boom fostered the kind of shifts described by Cantor. But especially since September 11, 2001, Americans have discovered that key components of globalization (technology, openness, cell phones, the Internet, financial flows, modern air travel) could be used to murderous effect against modern society, and public attitudes have shown signs of shifting in the direction of more traditional cultural values.

Reaction to globalization and America's role as the symbol of capitalism, modernity and mass culture takes a very different and more intense form in large areas of the developing world and especially in Muslim countries. Here, the intrusion of modern western values combined with the crisis of traditional societies in coping with economic and social change fosters a sometimes bitter backlash and periodically virulent forms of transference and scapegoating. Often, the forces of both attraction and repulsion are evident at the same time. This outlook, a kind of "cultural schizophrenia," is vividly evident in the television viewing habits of Middle Eastern youths, as described by a close observer:

Young people in particular . . . are simultaneously seduced and repelled by American culture. The most popular show on MBC [the most popular Arab satellite TV channel] is *Who Wants to be a Millionaire?* The same youths who shout 'death to

America' go home to read contraband copies of Hollywood magazines. What the Iranian philosopher Daryush Shayegan refers to as Islam's 'cultural schizophrenia'—the struggle between tradition and Western secular modernity, between fundamentalism and globalization—haunts the soul of many Muslims . . ."³⁹

As another example, on September 11th, patrons at a trendy Beirut coffee house applauded the televised pictures of the World Trade Center's destruction, while dressed in American style clothing and gathering in an establishment that would have fit within any upscale American neighborhood.⁴⁰

Major conflicts that ultimately concern radically different visions of society and identity are thus played out in the cultural realm. Though a great deal of comment has been devoted to these reactions as stemming from problems of poverty, environmental degradation, or in response to American policies, the root causes lie elsewhere. The most intense resentment of the United States is expressed by proponents of militant Islam. The words of Osama bin Laden are chilling in their unabashed hatred, as expressed, for example, in his February 1998 *fatwa* proclaiming, "The killing of Americans and their civilian and military allies is a religious duty for each and every Muslim to be carried out in whichever country they are found."⁴¹ But, as Fouad Ajami has observed, what really motivates bin Laden and his followers is rage over their inability to overthrow the existing Arab ruling order, which they redirect at America. Ajami captures both the paradoxical attraction and repulsion toward the United States and the bitter resentment of Arabs at their own broken societies and corrupt and authoritarian regimes:

Nothing grows in the middle between an authoritarian political order and populations given to perennial flings with dictators, abandoned to their most malignant hatreds. Something is amiss in an Arab world that besieges American embassies for visas and at the same time celebrates America's calamities.⁴²

This rage embodies both an historical and a modern component. There is frustration at the loss of grandeur for a civilization that once far outpaced Europe in its achievements but has in recent centuries fallen into anger and despair. There is a flavor of this in a bin Laden video aired in October 2001, which revels in the destruction of the World Trade Center and calls upon Muslims to wage war against America. The Al Qaeda leader invokes the memory of past Arab indignities:

What America is tasting now is something insignificant compared to what we have tasted for scores of years. Our nation [the Islamic world] has been tasting this humiliation and this degradation for more than 80 years.⁴³

The reference to "80 years" would be obscure for most western audiences but readily understood in the Arab world. The year, 1921, marked the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and thus the ultimate demise of the

Caliphate—Muslim civil and religious rule by the successors of Muhammad, which had lasted, at least symbolically, for nearly 1300 years. Documents found at sites in Afghanistan abandoned by Al Qaeda fighters contained even more explicit reference to the Caliphate, as in the words of one of the recovered texts:

[The Caliphate] is the only and best solution to the predicaments and problems from which Muslims suffer today and indubitable cure to the turbulence and internal struggles that plague them. It will remedy the economic underdevelopment which bequeathed upon us a political dependence on an atheist East and infidel West.⁴⁴

What is revealing about reference to the Caliphate is not only its irrelevance to the “predicaments and problems from which Muslims suffer today,” but also the notion that reestablishment of the Caliphate could somehow solve contemporary problems of economic development. Moreover, while bin Laden’s October video laments the carving up of the Middle East into a series of separate states that have largely failed to cope with the challenges of modernity, it ignores the fact that the United States had little to do with the Ottoman breakup and the drawing of borders. That legacy is shared by France and Britain, as the prevailing colonial powers of the day. Moreover, the events took place a quarter-century before the United States became a superpower in the aftermath of World War Two, and long before the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. But bin Laden’s focus upon America is evidence of how this rage has been redirected at the United States as the most powerful symbol of western values and modern economic, military and cultural influence.⁴⁵

Ultimately, the resentment and hostility is driven far less by poverty than by issues of identity, and its proponents are mostly from the university-educated professional and middle classes who comprise an embittered counter-elite within their own societies. Martin Kramer observes how this resentment is embodied by militant Islam:

[It is] the vehicle of counter-elites, people who, by virtue of education and/or income, are potential members of the elite, but who for some reason or another get excluded. Their education may lack some crucial prestige-conferring element; the sources of their wealth may be a bit tainted. Or they may just come from the wrong background. So while they are educated and wealthy, they have a grievance: their ambition is blocked, they cannot translate their socio-economic assets into political clout. Islamism is particularly useful to these people, in part because by its careful manipulation, it is possible to recruit a following among the poor, who make valuable foot-soldiers.⁴⁶

This is not an entirely new development. Some two decades ago, an Egyptian study found that jailed Islamists in that country were mostly of middle class origins, highly motivated, and often educated in engineering or science. Indeed, fifteen of the nineteen September 11th hijackers came from Saudi

Arabia, one of the Muslim world's wealthiest countries. Moreover, the two top leaders of Al Qaeda are bin Laden, the son of a Saudi billionaire, and Ayman al-Zawahiri, a wealthy Egyptian doctor. Indeed, militant Islam's ability to attract such competent, well motivated and ambitious people resembles that of fascism and Marxism-Leninism in their day.⁴⁷

Not only are these traits of Islamic extremists evident in their own countries, but they are also apparent among some Islamic and Arab emigres in Europe. For example, Mohamed Atta, the Saudi who piloted the hijacked airliner that slammed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center and is believed to be the ringleader of the hijackers, had lived with several of the terrorists in Germany and appears to have become increasingly alienated by his inability to find a place and purpose in that society despite his graduate education in urban planning. As Fouad Ajami has eloquently observed, "The modern world unsettled Atta . . . The magnetic power of the American imperium had fallen across his country. He arrived here with a presumption and a claim. We had intruded into his world; he would shatter the peace of ours. The glamorized world couldn't be fully had; it might as well be humbled and taken down."⁴⁸

In essence, an indigenous rage stemming from social disruption, oppression and alienation becomes transferred or redirected onto targets that have little to do with the sources of discontent. In its most nihilistic expressions, it takes the form of delusional conspiracy theories directed at the United States, the West, or Israel. As evidence, a Gallup survey of public opinion in nine Muslim countries found only 18% of respondents believe that Arabs carried out the September 11th attacks.⁴⁹ More blatantly, Arab and Muslim media disseminated conspiracy theories claiming a Jewish or Israeli hand behind the attack on the World Trade Center, and leading Saudi, Egyptian and Syrian papers have carried crude anti-Semitic stories—essentially a form of political pornography—including the old Czarist forgery, "The Protocols of the Elders of Zion" and the ancient libel that Jews use the blood of non-Jewish children in food prepared for Purim or Passover.⁵⁰

CONCLUSION

In an increasingly globalized world, culture has emerged as a central arena of contestation. Other issues on the globalization agenda, especially economic problems of trade, aid, investment and poverty, are more readily subject to negotiation and compromise. But precisely because culture has become a signifier for other more deep-seated and intractable issues, the problems it poses are harder to resolve. Culture in its various forms serves as a primary carrier of globalization and modern values, and cultural issues are

so fraught precisely because of their impact on both individual and national identity.

The idea that modernization often proves disruptive to traditional societies and that this can cause revolutionary turmoil is not new. In the mid-19th century, Alexis de Tocqueville concluded that rage and political upheaval stemmed not from poverty and deprivation or from the exercise of power itself, but from more symbolic causes including rising expectations, feelings of humiliation, and reactions against a ruler considered “illegitimate . . . and oppressive.”⁵¹ A century later, a leading social scientist, Seymour Martin Lipset, identified relative deprivation as a source of upheaval and found that disruptions caused by economic and social modernization could radicalize sections of the middle and professional classes and cause them to be attracted to extremist movements.⁵² But what is increasingly evident today is the key role played by culture, for it serves as the transmission belt by which so much of the impact of globalization and modern values is conveyed to foreign audiences, and through which identities are so profoundly challenged.

The animus directed against the United States is by no means uniform. And, as we have observed, expressions of it in Europe are much more modest and symbolic because globalization there (and in other regions where modern values prevail) does not dictate a profound cultural clash with pre-modern values. Moreover, in the post 9/11 world, basic European solidarity with the United States has been reinforced, along with a sense that Europe continues to require close links with America as insurance in a dangerous world.

Elsewhere, although American policies and practices can be a source of resentment, and primacy can readily translate into bruised feelings about the exercise of American power, the predominant sources of anti-Americanism are deep-seated and structural and only secondarily due to specific policies. This was especially evident in the aftermath of September 11th. A statement by sixty leading American scholars makes a telling point when it observes the way bin Laden and the attackers directed their hatred against the United States itself rather than make any specific policy demands:

... the killing was done for its own sake. The leader of Al Qaeda described the “blessed strikes” of September 11 as blows against America, “the head of world infidelity.” Clearly, then, our attackers despise not just our government, but our overall society, our entire way of living. Fundamentally, their grievance concerns not only what our leaders do, but also who we are.⁵³

The transference of deep-seated rage about turmoil and humiliation within their own societies into bitter attacks upon the United States can be understood in many ways, but above all it represents a sublimation of anger

and its redirection toward a source that has little to do with the problem in the first place. Deliberate scapegoating is increasingly evident too. The author Salman Rushdie, himself a target of a *fatwa* calling for his death as punishment for supposed blasphemy, captures this phenomenon when he writes that even if a Middle East peace settlement were achieved, anti-Americanism would be likely to continue unabated:

It has become too useful a smokescreen for Muslim nations' many defects—their corruption, their incompetence, their oppression of their citizens, their economic, scientific and cultural stagnation. America-hating has become a badge of identity, making possible a chest-beating, flag-burning rhetoric of word and deed that makes men feel good. It contains a strong streak of hypocrisy, hating most what it desires most, and elements of self-loathing. ('We hate America because it has made of itself what we cannot make of ourselves.') What America is accused of—closed-mindedness, stereotyping, ignorance—is also what its accusers would see if they looked into a mirror.⁵⁴

This transference is driven by several mechanisms: the desire of authoritarian regimes to deflect criticism away from their own corrupt rule, the agendas of virulently antimodernist movements which can now, paradoxically, utilize television and the Internet to disseminate their views, and widespread frustration and alienation. Yet Islamic radicalism is by no means dominant, and it remains contested within these societies, not least (as Afghanistan under Taliban rule demonstrated) because its antirational, theocratic and misogynist values do not provide a viable option for successfully confronting the tasks of modernization. Moreover, hostility to the U.S. is not universal and successful exercise of power can actually discourage opposition. For example, demonstrations against the initial American intervention in Afghanistan quickly subsided as U.S. and anti-Taliban forces gained the upper hand and it became evident that much of the Afghan population was celebrating its liberation from an oppressive regime.

In important parts of the Muslim world in the aftermath of September 11th and the defeat of the Taliban, moderate views have surfaced to contest the radical Islamist vision. In at least some cases, journalists, intellectuals and government leaders have condemned the 9/11 attacks, spoken out against extremism and the search for scapegoats, and have challenged the notion that returning to practices of the distant past can solve practical problems of society and economy. Thus, as a former Libyan Prime Minister has observed, "Perhaps most of the things we complain of . . . stem from our own flaws."⁵⁵

Ultimately, the causes of fanaticism and cultural backlash lie not within the United States and the West, but inside the troubled societies themselves. In these situations, culture is a mode of self and group expression and a source of upheaval and contestation. There is less a "clash of civilizations" than a

clash *within* civilizations. Outsiders can take steps to encourage moderate elements within these societies, but much more depends on developments inside the countries concerned. The outcome of this competition may ultimately determine whether globalization itself continues or instead is violently overturned—much as the guns of August 1914 touched off a World War and reversed a century of increasing openness, integration and interdependence.

ENDNOTES

1. Among other definitions of globalization, Thomas Friedman describes it as, “. . . the integration of everything with everything else” He adds that, “Globalization enables each of us, wherever we live, to reach around the world farther, faster and cheaper than ever before and at the same time allows the world to reach into each of us farther, faster, deeper, and cheaper than ever before.” See Friedman, “Techno Logic,” *Foreign Policy*, March/April 2002, p. 64. Also see Friedman’s *The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999).
2. Quoted by Fouad Ajami, “The New Faith,” *Saisphere*, Alumni Magazine of Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC 2000, p. 13.
3. Robert Gilpin makes this point well in observing that political scientists tend to overlook the role of markets, while economists often neglect the political context of events and the important role of power. See *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Direct Foreign Investment* (New York: Basic Books, 1975), pp. 4–5.
4. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1996.)
5. David Rothkopf, “In Praise of Cultural Imperialism?” *Foreign Policy*, No. 107 (Summer 1997): 38–53, at 39. A more ambivalent treatment is that of Benjamin Barber, *Jihad Versus McWorld* (New York: Times Books, 1995), who emphasizes the tensions between global and parochial values as increasingly central to world affairs.
6. Quotation from *Le Monde*, cited in Sophie Meunier, “The French Exception,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 4 (July/August 2000):104–116 at 107.
7. Charles Krauthammer, “Who Needs Gold Medals?” *Washington Post*, February 20, 2002.
8. Paul Kennedy, “The Eagle Has Landed,” *Financial Times* (London), February 1, 2002.
9. See especially William Wohlforth “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999): 5–41. Also see Lieber, *Eagle Rules?*, Chapter One, “Foreign Policy and American Primacy,” pp. 1–15.
10. Karsten Voight, a German foreign ministry official and influential figure in the Social Democratic Party, speaking in Washington on March 8, 2000, quoted in Peter Rodman, *Uneasy Giant: The Challenges to American Predominance* (Washington, DC: The Nixon Center, June 2000), p. 1.
11. Barbara Crosssette, “At the U.N. French Slips and English Stands Tall,” *New York Times*, March 25, 2001.
12. Data from “A World Empire By Other Means,” *The Economist* (London), December 22, 2001, pp. 65–67.
13. David Ignatius, “France’s Constructive Critic,” *Washington Post*, February 22, 2002.
14. “Globalization and Cinema,” in *Correspondence: An International Review of Culture and Society* (New York: The Committee on Intellectual Correspondence, published by the Council on Foreign Relations), No. 8, Summer/Fall, 2001, p. 1.
15. Keith Richburg, “Vive le Cinema! France Looks to Protect Its Film Industry’s ‘Cultural Exception,’” *Washington Post*, January 28, 2002.
16. Richburg, *Washington Post*, January 28, 2002.

17. *New York Times*, September 1, 2000.
18. Guy Konopnicki, "French Cinema's American Obsession," abridged from *Marianne*, March 5–11, 2001, reprinted in *Correspondence*, Summer/Fall 2001, p. 9.
19. Film titles on display at the Sony multiplex at Potsdammer Platz, June 17, 2000.
20. Marc Kaufman, "Afghanistan's Monument of Rubble," *Washington Post*, March 6, 2002.
21. *Subculture: the meaning of style* (London & NY: Routledge, 1979).
22. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1973): 22–49, at 27.
23. Louis Hebron and John F. Stack, Jr., "The Globalization Process: Debunking the Myths." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago, IL., 20–24 February, 2001.
24. Hebron & Stack, *Loc cit*.
25. The term is that of Joseph Nye, in *Bound To Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1990.) Also see Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone* (NY: Oxford UP, 2002.)
26. Richard Pells, "American Culture Goes Global, or Does It?" *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, April 12, 2002.
27. Selma Reuben Holo, *Beyond the Prado: Museums and Identity in Democratic Spain* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1999), p. 149.
28. Andrew Solomon, "An Awakening After the Taliban," *New York Times*, March 10, 2002. After the ouster of the Taliban, the new minister of information and culture, Said Makhtoum Rahim, estimated that the Taliban had destroyed "about 80% of our cultural identity."
29. Michael Howard, "What's in a Name? How to Fight Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 1 (January/February 2002): 8–13, at 13.
30. The 10% figure was used by French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine, cited in David Ignatius, "France's Constructive Critic," *Washington Post*, February 22, 2002. However, different polling questions provide a range of numbers. One poll taken during the spring 2002 Presidential election found 31% of respondents identifying the U.S. in response to the question, "Who are the principal adversaries of France?" See *Le Figaro*, "Suivi Presentielle 2002: Place de la France dans le monde. Sondage IFOP," *Le Figaro* (Paris), April 2, 2002.
31. The term is quoted in William Drodziak, "L'Etat C'est Mouse," *Washington Post*, March 2, 1992.
32. T.R. Reid, "After Shaky Start, London Bridge Reopens," *Washington Post*, February 23, 2002.
33. Robert Paarlberg, "The Global Food Fight," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 3 (May/June 2000): 24–38. Paarlberg's analysis of this issue is compelling, and he also notes that the de facto ban has blocked corn imports from the United States worth roughly \$200 million annually to U.S. farmers.
34. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001.
35. David Brooks summarizes these ideas in his thoughtful review of Cantor's book. See "Farewell to Greatness: America from Gilligan's Island to the X-Files," *The Weekly Standard*, September 17, 2001, pp. 31–35.
36. Data in Jeffrey M. Jones, "Ratings of Government and Bush Remain High," Gallup News Service, October 31, 2001, www.gallup.com/poll/Releases/pr011031f.asp.
37. See Larry Kudlow, "Closing the Book on Tina," townhall.com, February 1, 2002. Kudlow makes a strong case for the post 9/11 cultural shift described above.
38. Source: hardcover nonfiction bestseller list, *New York Times Book Review*, March 3, 2002, p. 18.
39. David Hoffman, "Beyond Public Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 2 (March/April 2002), p. 89
40. Elisabetta Burba "How Lebanon Reacted to the News," *Wall Street Journal Europe*, September 19, 2001. As yet another example, Osama bin Laden in his video denunciations of the United States seems to be wearing a Timex Ironman Triathlon watch. See

- Edward Rothstein. "Damning (Yet Desiring) Mickey and the Big Mac: It Isn't Imperialism but Freedom That Makes Pop Culture So Appealing Even Among America's Enemies," *New York Times*, March 2, 2002.
41. Quoted in "British Detail bin Laden Tie to U.S. Attacks," *New York Times*, October 5, 2001. Also see text of report issued by British government, "Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States, 11 September, 2001," reprinted in the same issue.
 42. Fouad Ajami, "Arabs Have Nobody to Blame but Themselves," *Wall Street Journal*, October 16, 2001. Also see Ajami, *The Dream Palace of the Arabs: A Generation's Odyssey* (New York: Pantheon, 1998.)
 43. Text of bin Laden Remarks. "Hypocrisy Rears Its Ugly Head," as broadcast by al-Jazeera television on October 7, 2001. *Washington Post*, October 8, 2001.
 44. David Rhode and C. J. Chivers, "Qaeda's Grocery Lists and Manuals of Killing," *New York Times*, March 17, 2002, p. 18.
 45. On this point, see Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong? Approaches to the Modern History of the Middle East* (NY: Oxford University Press, 2002.)
 46. Quoted in Daniel Pipes, "God and Mammon: Does Poverty Cause Militant Islam?" *The National Interest*, No. 66 (Winter 2001/02), pp. 14–21 at p. 17.
 47. The Egyptian study was conducted in 1980 by a respected Egyptian scholar, Said Eddin Ibrahim, and is cited in Pipes, p. 16. It should be noted that in the late 1990s, Ibrahim himself was jailed as a result of his vigorous efforts to promote democratic freedoms within Egypt. Daniel Pipes makes a compelling argument that militant Islam is not a response to poverty and has often surged in countries experiencing rapid economic growth. He concludes that militant Islam has far more to do with issues of identity than with economics. P. 14.
 48. Fouad Ajami, "Nowhere Man," *New York Times Magazine*, October 7, 2001.
 49. These data, in a survey done by Gallup for *USA Today* and CNN, should be regarded with some caution. Although Gallup polled nearly 10,000 respondents in nine countries (Pakistan, Iran, Indonesia, Turkey, Lebanon, Morocco, Kuwait, Jordan and Saudi Arabia), the percentages reported may not be reliable. Summary data for the entire group were not weighted by size of population, non-citizens were included, and the political cultures in most of the countries would make respondents wary of expressing their views candidly. See, Richard Morin and Claudia Dean, "The Poll That Didn't Add Up: Spin on Data Blurs Findings From Gallup's Muslim Survey," *Washington Post*, March 23, 2002. Also see CNN.com, "Poll: Muslims Call U.S. 'Ruthless, Arrogant'," February 26, 2001.
 50. An appalling example appeared in a Saudi newspaper, the government daily, *Al-Riyadh*. In a two part series, a columnist, Dr. Umayma Ahmad Al-Jalahma of King Faysal University in Al-Damman, wrote on the "Jewish Holiday of Purim," stating that, "For this holiday, the Jewish people must obtain human blood so that their clerics can prepare the holiday pastries." The article is translated in *MEMRI*, Middle East research Institute, Special Dispatch—Saudi Arabia/Anti-Semitism, 3.13.02, No. 354, www.memri.org. The blood libel has also appeared in the Egyptian government dailies, *Al-Ahram* (October 28, 2000) and *Al-Akhbar* (October 20, 2000 and March 25, 2001), see *MEMRI's* Special Dispatches #150 and 201.
 51. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (NY: Harper & Row, 1967), Author's Introduction, p. 14. Also see *The Old Regime and the Revolution*; ed. Francois Furet and Francoise Melonio (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). Originally published, (NY: Harper & Brothers, 1856).
 52. Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1960), pp. 131ff.
 53. "What We're Fighting For: A Letter From America," Text of statement from a group of American scholars, *Chronicle of Higher Education*, posted February 12, 2002: http://chronicle.com/weekly/documents/v48/i24/4824sep_11_letter.htm
 54. Salman Rushdie, "America and the Anti-Americans," *New York Times*, February 4, 2002.
 55. Abd Al-Hamid Al-Bakkoush, "The U.S. and the Complexities of the Arab Mind," *Al-Hayat* (London), February 12, 2002. Quoted in *MEMRI*, 2/22/02, No. 348, February 22, 2002. www.memri.org.